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Abstract: Public sector actors often provide financial or planning support to 
intermodal terminal developments with the aim of achieving societal benefits 
through modal shift from road haulage to rail transport. Once operational, such 
terminals exhibit a variety of governance models with varying levels of power 
and responsibility shared between public and private actors. This paper reviews 
a selection of contracts between rail infrastructure owners, terminal owners, 
terminal operators and rail operators in order to determine the incentives, 
commitments and risks involved in specifying such responsibilities between 
actors. The two markets analysed are Sweden and the UK, with similar 
histories of liberalisation of rail operations. In the Swedish context, terminal 
infrastructure owners, usually public actors, want to act as landlords but 
continuously find themselves involved in daily operational and commercial 
situations. In the UK, long leases on token rents mean that few commitments or 
investments are required by private operators as long as they remain in use and 
allow open access. Policy implications are discussed and recommendations 
made for future research. 
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1 Introduction 
A significant amount of research on intermodal transport has focused on the development 
of terminals, particularly the role of the public sector in supporting such facilities with 
financial or planning support (e.g., Bergqvist, 2013; Caris et al., 2008; Flämig and Hesse, 
2011; Liedtke and Carillo Murillo, 2012; Monios and Wilmsmeier, 2012; Ng and Gujar, 
2009; Roso, 2008). This public sector support is based on expected benefits such as 
emissions and congestion reduction due to modal shift to rail or increased competiveness 
arising from improved access to major trade links. These expectations are based on ideal 
scenarios of significant modal shift, but such scenarios are only likely if the terminals can 
offer a high quality handling service at low prices to the rail service operators, who in 
turn can then offer regular reliable services to shippers and forwarders at prices 
competitive with road haulage. The relationship between public sector planners and 
funders and private sector rail operators is thus of the utmost importance in establishing 
economically competitive intermodal terminals. 
Such analysis of the role of the public sector in terminal development has become a 
topic of increasing pertinence due to the liberalisation of rail operations in Europe with 
the result that both public and private actors are involved in developing, maintaining and 
using rail infrastructure. Hesse (2008, p.46) observed that the consequence of this 
situation is that “policy goals become more difficult to achieve: competitive dynamics 
between firms and – particularly – between municipalities do not allow for setting 
standards, demanding for commitments, etc. The more speculative the nature of 
development, the more contingent planning will be”. 
This contingent nature of modern planning for intermodal transport means that public 
actors find it difficult to tie funding support for intermodal terminal development to 
conditions for the operational model of the terminal. This situation raises the risk that the 
terminal may not be operated on a viable economic model capable of supporting a rail 
service of sufficient quality to be attractive to shippers and forwarders and thus achieve 
the desired modal shift. The result can be that the terminal ceases operation or requires 
ongoing public subsidy. Research is, therefore, required into the link between the initial 
funding (both public and private) and the business model of the terminal. The business 
model will have as much determining influence on the success of the terminal as 
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transport cost analysis of what may be an ideal scenario (e.g., regular full trains in both 
directions), yet it is the latter that usually forms the basis of public sector funding 
decisions. Therefore, this paper will analyse the business model as it is observed in the 
contracts between key actors in the rail industry. 
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on a selection of contracts between the 
infrastructure (network) owner, the infrastructure (terminal) owner, the terminal operator 
and the rail operator, analysed within the context of the rail system in each country. The 
issues raised by this analysis are given additional context through interviews with some 
of the contracted parties. The two countries analysed are Sweden and the UK, according 
to the rationale that these are two of the earliest countries in Europe to liberalise their rail 
freight networks and vertically separate infrastructure and services1. The methodology is 
necessarily exploratory due to the small sample of commercially sensitive data; 
nevertheless, it is the process of specifying responsibilities in contracts that is being 
observed rather than establishing the frequency of such contract types. The goal is 
therefore to identify and classify incentives, responsibilities, commitments and risks 
involved in such contract negotiations and specifications, which can then be used to 
develop a template applicable in other national contexts to compare how the same 
contractual features are managed in other cases. 
The theoretical background is drawn from port governance where a large body of 
work has analysed how public and private aims are achieved through various governance 
models. The landlord model has proved the most popular because it retains a mechanism 
for public sector aims to be achieved while also increasing efficiency and lowering prices 
by allowing experienced private sector operators to compete for the market. While 
analysis of the best governance models has been a rich seam of research in the port 
sector, this topic has received little attention in the intermodal literature. This oversight is 
surprising since a large quantity of resources has been spent developing terminals with an 
apparent assumption that the development process is the difficult part and that once a site 
is built it can be handed over to the private sector for efficient and economically 
competitive operation. The large number of underutilised terminals in Europe suggest 
that this is not the case; research is, therefore, needed to address governance models at 
intermodal terminals to understand the different motivations of each actor and how they 
attempt to achieve them through the agreements they make with each other in terms of 
contract lengths, service requirements, maintenance, price, retention of infrastructure 
investments and so on. 
Following this introduction, the paper reviews the literature on port governance and 
then applies these findings to the key issues relevant to intermodal terminal development 
and operation. The context of the rail sector is then explained in order to identify the 
contractual relationships to be examined through empirical analysis. Section 4 presents 
the empirical content which is then analysed in the following section. Section 6 concludes 
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2 Theoretical background for governance analysis 
2.1 Introduction to governance 
Two useful theoretical approaches to logistics management are transaction cost 
economics (TCE) and resource-based view (RBV). According to TCE, firms adopt a 
variety of relationships with each other in order to lower transaction costs associated with 
a purely transaction-based arrangement whereby relationships are based on market 
contracts (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985). RBV is based on the management of 
resources within the firm (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) and increasingly, across all 
actors in a supply chain (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006; Peters et al., 2011; 
Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011). Following an RBV approach, more partners in the 
cooperation agreement provides more resources from which to benefit, whereas 
according to TCE, communication and coordination become more complex as the 
number of firms increases (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2011). Both of these approaches 
can help understand why particular governance forms are adopted. 
In this paper, however, the interest is exploratory, to identify and classify different 
kinds of contracts and how they are used as a governance form to manage these 
transactions and resources. Therefore the theoretical approach has been drawn from 
governance analysis which is itself a large area of research. 
Governance can be defined as a process of distributing authority and allocating 
resources, of managing relationships, behaviour or processes to achieve a desired 
outcome. Much governance literature is about process, asking questions about how power 
should be exercised, performance measured and outcomes regulated. This focus relates to 
the core of the difference between governance and government. It is not necessarily about 
the location of official responsibility but how a process is governed and an outcome 
achieved. In the field of (non-freight) transport, governance and institutional approaches 
have been applied predominately to transport provision and its regulation by government 
organisations (Curtis and Lowe, 2012; Geerlings and Stead, 2003; Gifford and Stalebrink, 
2002; Legacy et al., 2012; Marsden and Rye, 2010; Pemberton, 2000; Stough and 
Rietveld, 1997). 
2.2 Port governance 
Port governance has been treated comprehensively in the literature. As major engines for 
driving economies, control of ports is a significant lever for governments to manage trade 
and its resultant economic benefits. Over recent decades, a general trend has been 
observed for port management to move from the public to the private sector. Numerous 
studies have examined different models of port governance (e.g., Baird, 2000, 2002; 
Baltazar and Brooks, 2001; Brooks, 2004; Brooks and Cullinane, 2007; Brooks and 
Pallis, 2008; Cullinane and Song, 2002; Everett and Robinson, 1998; Ferrari and Musso, 
2011; Hoffman, 2001; Notteboom, 2006; Notteboom et al., 2013; Pallis and Syriopoulos, 
2007; Verhoeven and Vanoutrive, 2012). The World Bank (2001, 2007) identified four 
models: the public service port, the private port, the tool port (a mixed model where 
private sector operators perform some of the operations but under the direction of public 
sector managers) and the landlord port (the public sector retains ownership while the 
terminal management and operations are leased to private sector operators). While the 
landlord model has become increasingly common across the globe and indeed 
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encouraged by the World Bank and others, implementation of port devolution policies 
has been observed to vary according to local conditions (e.g., Baird, 2002; Ng and Pallis, 
2010; Wang and Slack, 2004; Wang et al., 2004). 
Advantages of greater private sector involvement in ports include increased efficiency 
and reduced cost to the public sector, while negative impacts include the loss or increased 
ambiguity of state control as well as the difficulties and risks involved in managing the 
tender process and subsequent monitoring (Baird, 2002). However, it has been found that 
governance decisions are not always related to port performance (Brooks and Pallis, 
2008). 
Bichou and Gray (2005) asserted that simple taxonomies are difficult because of the 
diversity of port functions [see also Beresford et al. (2004) and Sánchez and Wilmsmeier 
(2010)] and suggested that three elements are generally included: the role of public and 
private actors, the governance model and the scope of facilities, assets and services. This 
approach will underpin the current paper’s attempt to expand simple terminal governance 
models with a focus on the responsibilities of key actors and how they are specified in 
contracts between them. 
2.3 Intermodal terminal governance 
Despite an extensive literature on the development and operation of intermodal terminals, 
governance has rarely been addressed directly, although it has been touched upon as part 
of other discussions. Lessons from governance analysis in the port sector have rarely 
been applied to intermodal terminals, regardless of the many similarities between the two 
settings2. This is partly because inland freight nodes tend to be smaller concerns than 
ports, with simpler governance structures and less government involvement. While 
landlord models are in evidence, government involvement is more likely in the start-up 
phase using public money to attract a private operator into the market, after which it is 
assumed that the site will be run by private operators with no further government 
involvement (Monios, 2013). However, Bergqvist et al. (2010) showed that sites 
developed without direct involvement of an operator have been found to have higher 
risks of optimism bias. This is because terminal volume is linked to traffic flows; 
therefore the terminal operator requires a close relationship if not some level of 
integration with the rail operator to guarantee usage. The potential success of intermodal 
transport services relies on the logistics model of the clients and the relations with 
transport actors such as rail operators and port terminal operators. This is why the 
business model of the operational terminal must be linked with the initial decision to fund 
a terminal development. 
Monios (2013, 2014) applied governance theory to the relationship between 
intermodal terminals and logistics platforms, developing a four-level conceptual 
framework: 
1 the developer of the intermodal terminal and/or logistics platform 
2 the operator of the intermodal terminal and/or logistics platform 
3 internal operation model (relation between intermodal terminal and logistics 
platform) 
4 external operation model (relation with clients and others). 
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The fourth level of the typology was divided into three sections: relation between 
logistics platform and site tenants, relation between intermodal terminal and rail service 
providers and the relation between either the intermodal terminal or the logistics platform 
and ports. This paper will expand the second section in greater detail, in order to examine 
how the contract between the terminal operator and the rail service provider(s) affects the 
ability of the terminal operator to achieve not only their own goals of economic 
profitability, but more importantly the goals of the backers of the terminal (e.g., public 
sector planners and funders, rail authorities and/or regulators). 
For example, government funders want to achieve modal shift by removing  
barriers to rail freight such as upfront costs, sunk costs and availability of suitable 
terminal locations, rail authorities want to provide sufficient capacity and quality of 
infrastructure for freight operators, rail regulators want to ensure fair competition  
and open access to infrastructure and terminals. But it is not clear that appropriate 
measures are enshrined in contracts in order to achieve these goals. Operators will  
only enter the market and provide services if they believe they can operate profitably, but 
government agencies must decide how to incentivise this market entry without granting 
monopoly power to an operator that would inhibit fair competition with other operators. 
There is no point exchanging the previous public monopoly with a new private 
monopoly. 
Brooks and Cullinane (2007) analysed port governance models in terms of the key 
functions, resources and responsibilities of infrastructure owners, operators and 
regulators. This model can be adapted for analysis of governance models at intermodal 
terminals, identifying the key relationships that require contractual specification, which 
will then be analysed in the empirical section. Brooks and Cullinane (2007) also suggest 
that assigning clear roles for all actors (e.g., regulator, landlord, operator) is not always 
possible, due to the overlap and unclear boundaries between responsibilities. In order to 
identify these responsibilities, Table 1 sets out the key functions and actors in intermodal 
operations, expanded from a similar matrix developed by Baltazar and Brooks (2001) for 
analysis of port governance. 
The table shows that some key areas of interest are shared between more than one 
actor, revealing that how these relationships are specified in contracts is a potential risk in 
achieving successful operations. Brooks and Cullinane (2007, p.412) state that “What is 
missing is the determination of whether highly prescriptive or loosely guided approaches 
are more effective in generating strong performance”. The public backers of a terminal 
want to incentivise this good performance, but how should the individual shared 
responsibilities be specified in order to achieve this? 
Finally, Brooks and Cullinane (2007, p.433) assert that “ports do not appear to  
match methods of governing this activity with primary purpose, contrary to the  
principles proposed by the strategic management literature”. If this is the case in ports 
which have a much more sophisticated and historical experience of devolution, 
privatisation and corporatisation, how much more likely is it for intermodal  
terminals where private operation is a relatively new area and governments are  
still attempting to find the best way of regulating them to achieve goals for all 
stakeholders? The research question for this paper is thus: how do the various contracts 
enable or constrain these goals? 
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3 The national context of intermodal terminal governance 
In this section the national context of intermodal terminal governance is explored based 
on the situations in Sweden and the UK. 
When British Rail assets were privatised in the 1990s3, the network infrastructure 
passed to newly-created company Railtrack (now Network Rail)4. Ownership of all 
British Rail’s 12 container terminals went to the intermodal service operator Freightliner, 
which was privatised through a management buyout. As this operator was making a loss 
pre-privatisation, the buyout was incentivised via a track access grant of £75 m (Fowkes 
and Nash, 2004). Private container terminals connected to the public network already 
existed at that time and new ones have been developed since, now operated by a diverse 
group such as rail operators (e.g., Freightliner, DB Schenker, DRS, First GBRf), 3PLs 
(e.g., WH Malcolm, Stobart, JG Russell), port operators (e.g., ABP) and others (Monios, 
2012). Most of the sites are owner-operated, whereas some are leased from private sector 
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companies such as real estate developers and a small number are leased from public 
sector entities such as municipalities and a few from Network Rail. 
At privatisation, around 85% of UK rail freight was non-unitised general freight 
(mostly bulk) and the vast majority of freight handling sites were transferred to 
Railtrack/Network Rail. These sites were then leased to private operators, some on 
commercial rents but mostly on token or ‘peppercorn’ rents. The majority of these leases 
were for 125 years, with few requirements of the operators other than that the sites must 
remain open access and if they are not being used then they will return to the 
infrastructure owner. The majority of these sites were leased to the constituent companies 
that then formed EWS and were since acquired by DB Schenker. Ninty-two sites 
remained in the property of Railtrack, listed on a strategic freight site list that meant they 
could not be sold on for other use and must remain available for rail use. This list is 
reviewed regularly and sites may be taken off this list if it is felt that there is no realistic 
possibility of them being used again, in which case they can be sold for other purposes 
(ORR, 2011). As it is these general/bulk freight terminals rather than container terminals 
that are leased from the public sector to private operators, these are the UK contractual 
models that will be used for analysis in this paper. 
If a terminal owner or operator wants to connect a site to the network (either 
reconnecting a disused terminal or a brand new connection for a new development), they 
must pay for all works including within the terminal boundary, the new connecting track 
and the switches and other work on the mainline. An agreement will be drawn up with 
Network Rail agreeing the annual maintenance costs of that section of track. There is a 
general scheme for freight infrastructure funding (FFG – recently scrapped in England 
and Wales but retained in Scotland) which can be used for any works on a terminal (e.g., 
new cranes, additional tracks, upgraded hard standing and also including the new 
mainline connection). This funding is to encourage modal shift from road to rail and is 
based on the operator identifying a stream of traffic that will shift to using the site if the 
work is carried out. However, there is no mechanism for taking this money back if the 
flow disappears, as long as the operator shows that it was not their fault. 
The Swedish terminal network can be said to have evolved in stages5. The first stage 
was fairly intense development when the state-owned rail operator SJ built some  
40 terminals to facilitate the start of intermodal traffic (Bergqvist et al., 2010). The 
terminal network was rationalised during the 1980s and 1990s and decreased to about  
15 terminals. One explanation for the reduction of number of terminals was the increased 
focus on direct block trains, while the smaller terminals did not have a sufficient 
customer base to justify a full block train. New operators also settled into the market and 
the potential for cross-subsidisation between lines decreased. State profitability 
requirements of rail operations were also tightened during this period. 
During the 1990s new terminals started to be developed again as a response to the 
deregulation of the railway market and the entrance of new rail operators. One of the 
reasons for the development was that the new rail operators had difficulty getting access 
to existing terminals since they were controlled by the main rail operator and not open 
access. The focus of the new operators was primarily on direct container shuttle trains to 
and from the port of Gothenburg. Examples of these are Eskilstuna, Nässjö, Insjön, 
Falköping, Hallsberg, Åmal and Ahus (c.f., Bergqvist and Flodén, 2010). In some cases 
ports also developed intermodal terminals. 
The Swedish government has had a somewhat passive role in the development of 
intermodal terminals in the past. They have been more focused on ownership issues 
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related to the state-owned rail operator, infrastructure development and the deregulation 
process. A few government-initiated investigations have been made focusing on the 
terminal network with the purpose of identifying critical terminals with special national 
interest from a transport system perspective. The purpose is to ensure that the Swedish 
Transport Administration considers these carefully in their overall planning and 
investment strategies for connecting infrastructure. 
In both the UK and Swedish cases similar goals related to terminal development can 
be identified. From a public and landlord perspective, modal shift and sustainability 
remain the top priority, as well as congestion reduction, increasing employment and the 
competitiveness of local and regional businesses (c.f., Bergqvist, 2007; Bergqvist et al., 
2010; Haywood, 2002; Woodburn, 2008). 
Based on the situations in the UK and Sweden, a conceptual framework has been 
developed to illustrate the contractual context of intermodal terminal governance  
(Figure 1). 














ROA CA:    Connecting agreement 
TOA: Terminal operator agreement 
TAA: Terminal access agreement 
ROA: Rail operator agreement 
 
Figure 1 classifies the contractual agreements between the key stakeholders. Wiegmans  
et al. (1999) used Porter’s (1980) five forces model to discuss relations between these 
stakeholders but empirical analysis of how such power relations operate in practice is 
rare. This analysis will be the focus of the empirical section to follow. 
4 Empirical data 
4.1 Methodology 
The choice of a case study research approach was based on the ambition to analyse the 
dynamics of the phenomenon from a ‘why’ and ‘how’ perspective (c.f., Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Hilmola et al., 2005; Silverman, 2001; Yin, 1994). Case studies are particularly useful for 
exploratory research. The cases selected are Sweden and the UK, based on the rationale 
that these are two of the earliest countries in Europe to liberalise their rail freight 
networks and vertically separate infrastructure and services. 
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For this paper, the contracts analysed in Sweden are mostly container and mixed 
container/bulk intermodal terminals, whereas in the UK they are general freight and bulk 
terminals. This is because in the UK container terminals are for the most part privately 
owned (see above), whereas general freight terminals are owned by the public sector and 
leased to private operators, thus providing a suitable axis of comparison of leasing 
models. The focus of this study is not the nature of shipment (bulk or containers) but the 
contractual agreements and context. 
Some difference in relationships can be observed between Sweden and the UK, in 
that the terminal owner in the UK bulk market analysed in this paper is mostly the same 
as the infrastructure owner; it is primarily the UK container terminal market where the 
terminal owner will be different from the infrastructure owner. However, the same issues 
are addressed in the contracts, regardless of the precise relation of the actors, therefore 
the classification in Figure 1 allows both national contexts to be analysed. 
Data availability in this field can be difficult due to commercial sensitivity which may 
also explain the paucity of research on this topic. It is, therefore, not appropriate to 
conduct quantitative analysis of contracts because strict frequency counts of certain 
contract clauses, for instance, could be misleading, especially with a small sample. The 
paper is therefore limited to an exploratory approach. The analysis proceeds inductively 
from a review of terminal contracts (identifying similarities, differences and 
uncertainties) to interviews with stakeholders (terminal owners, terminal operators, rail 
operators and public sector actors) to gather more insight on these issues. This process of 
analysis then leads to an identification of relevant issues in the contractual processes that 
will then be linked back to the key functions classified in the literature review. The goal 
is not to enumerate statistical frequencies of contract types but to explore the governance 
relationships and how they can be constrained or enabled by contract design, which has 
clear implications for policy makers. 
A selection of agreements were analysed and issues relevant to the key functions 
identified in table 1 were drawn out and are listed below. The description is structured in 
accordance with the agreements specified in the conceptual framework illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
4.2 Connecting agreement (CA) 
This agreement regulates the framework and conditions for connecting the terminal with 
the rail network. The main conditions specified in the agreements are usually: 
• physical boundaries 
• time restrictions of the contract 
• conditions for operations and maintenance across boundaries 
• accessibility of road, facilities and installations 
• demands and routines for documentation 
• condition for transfer of contract in case of change of ownership of the terminal. 
Overall, the agreement is very often focused on technical issues related to infrastructure 
and its boundaries in order to establish responsibility of specific parts of the 
infrastructure. 
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4.3 Terminal operator agreement (TOA) 
The terminal operator agreements (TOAs) have some obvious similarities with the CA 
but are generally much more comprehensive in their discussion of conditions for 
commercial operations. In this regard, it is important to emphasise that in the UK case of 
general freight terminals discussed in this paper (as opposed to UK container terminals), 
the terminal infrastructure owner and the infrastructure authority is generally the same 
organisation. The main issues generally addressed in this agreement are: 
• physical boundaries 
• fees and rent 
• time restrictions (length of contract, possible extension) 
• open access 
• marketing and branding, resources 
• options, e.g., first option to adjacent warehouses 
• enough resources (financial competence to operate and develop the terminal) 
• follow up (financially separated) 
• facilitate hand-over 
• follow general laws and regulations 
• responsibilities for maintenance 
• permission process for contract transfer 
• damage regulation of infrastructure 
• statistics and documentation of handled goods volumes, wagons, trains, etc. 
The agreements often contain several conditions but most of them have difficulty 
defining key concepts and terms such as the process for hand-over, principles and 
conditions for infrastructure investments by the terminal operator and variable fees 
connected to different segments and services (e.g., fee per handled container, trailer, 
swap-body, storage of load units, etc.). Some agreements clearly define the price that the 
terminal operator can charge while others only focus on determining the fee or rent in the 
relationship between infrastructure authority/owner and terminal infrastructure owner. 
Another aspect often missing is the principles and process for capacity planning and the 
principles for assigning capacity to rail operators. 
4.4 Terminal access agreement (TAA) 
The agreement between the terminal owner and the rail operator usually focuses on: 
• deadlines and routines for requesting capacity 
• restrictions that they follow general and specific laws and regulations for that 
terminal 
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• specifications for rail operator statistics and documentation of wagons and trains. 
The documentation aspect is often related to invoicing of variable fees from the terminal 
infrastructure owner to the terminal operator. In Sweden the agreements usually do not 
involve the terminal operator as a contract party, whereas in the UK the reverse is the 
case, as it is the terminal operator who makes the agreement with the rail operator, 
therefore in that case the TAA and the ROA are the same document. 
4.5 Rail operator agreement (ROA) 
This agreement focuses on the commercial conditions for using the terminal and its 
services combined with conditions for capacity and the process for applying for capacity. 
The commercial conditions can look very different depending on the rail operator and the 
services offered and demanded and the length of the contract is usually about one to two 
years. 
5 Analysis of intermodal terminal governance 
5.1 Summary of findings 
From analysing different types of agreements between different actors and through 
interviews with stakeholders a number of critical aspects related to stakeholder 
agreements have been identified. These are summarised in Table 2. The identified aspects 
for discussion can mainly be characterised as potential risks that the agreements and the 
underlying goals and incentives agreed upon become less effective. 
Table 2 Comparing intermodal terminal governance in Sweden and the UK 
 Sweden UK 
Rail market analysed Container and general General/bulk 
Year of deregulation 1996 1994 
Infrastructure ownership Public Public (nominally-private but only 
shareholder is the government) 
Terminal ownership Public Mostly public but some private 
Terminal operation Mixed Private 
Open user Yes Yes (for public sites only) 
Vertical integration Rare Common 
Contract length Short Very long 
Maintenance Public Private 
Setter of terminal fees Public/private Private 
Decider of handover Public Public (for public sites only) 
5.2 Time-perspectives 
Divergent time-perspectives between the agreements constitute a risk that changes to 
incentives, etc. in an agreement cannot be effectively transferred to the interrelated 
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agreements without a significant time lag. In Sweden, there is a tendency to sign rather 
short agreements, particularly for operations; TOAs are often shorter than five years. In 
the UK, leases are very long, typically 125 years and they can only be transferred either 
voluntarily by the operator, or else forced (what is called ‘alienated’) by the infrastructure 
owner. This is not a straightforward process and can be blocked by the timetabling of 
‘ghost’ trains or tabling spot bids (ORR, 2011). In combination with requirements that 
the terminal operator needs to own and manage assets necessary for terminal operations, 
there is a built-in conflict in Sweden between short-term contracts and long-term 
investments in e.g., handling equipment. This divergence in time perspectives contributes 
to a lack of incentives for long-term investment and instead increases the likelihood of 
requiring short-term and more expensive solutions, such as short-term leasing of 
equipment (e.g., mobile cranes/reach-stackers). Yet in the UK, if a site is forcibly 
transferred to another operator, there remains the danger that an operator could lose their 
investment. 
5.3 Hand-over 
Principles for effective and efficient hand-over between terminal operators are another 
identified shortcoming in many of the studied TOAs. There are often sections stating that 
the current terminal operator should be helpful in contributing to a frictionless change of 
operators. However, few agreements define exactly how and the consequences if the 
terminal infrastructure owner believes the current terminal operator have not been 
sufficiently helpful. Indeed, the contract often does not define if the new terminal 
operator should have the opportunity to purchase equipment that the current operator 
possesses and uses for its terminal operations. Several terminal infrastructure owners in 
Sweden identified this as a problem when changing terminal operators and in some cases 
the consequences have been dramatic with terminal operations being offline for periods 
of time. 
A further complication is when public backers develop a terminal that then runs at a 
loss and they would like to sell it off (often at a token price) to the private sector. This 
means that, not only is the public actor relinquishing control of the site but that the large 
investment will not be recouped and may need to be made again in future. This was the 
case with one of the municipality-owned Swedish terminals and represents the danger of 
not linking the initial funding decision to a coherent business model for site and service 
operation. 
The handover issue is also relevant in the UK. In theory, if a site operator loses all its 
traffic to another operator, that operator can then take over lease of the site. But this 
makes it very difficult for a new operator to bid for traffic with the proviso that they have 
to take over the site; this uncertainty makes the new bid very unreliable and risky for both 
operator and potential customer. UK rail operators gave examples of both positive and 
negative transfers through the alienation process, but in the worst cases claims were made 
that potential business had been lost because site transfer could not be effected quickly 
enough to begin handling the new traffic. 
A clearly defined principle that states key equipment that the new operator is entitled 
to take over and the associated principle for valuing that equipment would help 
overcoming this problem and risk. This would also reduce the inherent cost of changing 
terminal operator. 
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5.4 Fees and rent 
This is another complicated aspect where in Sweden there are great differences between 
different terminals and agreements. Some apply rents and fixed charges while others 
apply variable fees based on handled volumes or a combination of both. However, many 
terminal infrastructure owners described problems in forecasting different scenarios and 
situations beforehand and it is not unusual that the terminal operator attracts goods flows 
and goods types that are not clearly defined in the TOA. In those cases, the argument 
from the infrastructure owner is that this should be regulated through a separate 
agreement or the current agreement should be revised in line with the new circumstances. 
The terminal operator of course argues that, since this is an undefined segment developed 
by the terminal operator, it falls outside the scope of the current agreement and there is no 
justification for the terminal infrastructure owner to claim fees for this segment. 
Several stakeholders have experienced this problem related to segments that were not 
anticipated and defined in the original TOA. Examples of such segments are handling and 
storage of cars, macadam or material for rail infrastructure construction. Some terminal 
infrastructure owners have regulated this by defining the goods segments and the 
corresponding fees in the TOA and in case there is a request for handling other types of 
goods, a separate agreement must be made, defining the conditions for this operation and 
segment. In some cases, this approach might be difficult when the time available for 
negotiating a complementary agreement is very limited until operations are planned to 
start. Overall, the level of fees and rent are at very low levels and rarely even cover the 
cost of maintenance and even less so the investment costs. 
In the UK, rent of bulk terminals is a token ‘peppercorn’ rent. The operators are then 
free to do whatever they like with the terminal as long as the terminal remains in use and 
remains open access. If either of these situations change, then the terminal will go back to 
Network Rail who can then lease it to a new operator if any is interested. Such conditions 
are obviously very attractive to operators, who can set their own handling fees according 
to market forces. There is thus clear evidence suggesting that terminal operations in both 
countries are subsidised by the terminal infrastructure owner. 
5.5 Open access 
In most terminal infrastructure agreements and TOA s there are paragraphs emphasising 
the importance of open access. However, in the Swedish contracts, one single definition 
of the term cannot be found nor a description of how a failure to meet this condition 
would be determined or such accusations investigated. 
The ORR (rail regulator in the UK) has been investigating whether some sites are 
really open access and if anti-competitive behaviour is in evidence and some sites may be 
taken back into public management (this includes both actual operating sites and  
so-called ‘ransom strips’ which are sections of marshalling/connecting track that a train 
must pass through to access a site) (ORR, 2011; Network Rail, 2012). All leased 
terminals must accept traffic from competitors unless the terminal is operating at full 
capacity, but it is not easy to specify exactly how capacity can be proven and the quality 
of service that must be provided to a competitor. A company can obey the letter of the 
law while still gaining undue competitive advantage. 
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In theory, the failure to meet this condition would mean a cancellation of the contract, 
but the lack of definition and a clear process for investigating such circumstances is 
probably the reason why no stakeholders have experienced such a situation. 
5.6 Vertical integration 
Vertical integration between terminal operation and rail service operation is common in 
the UK since the majority of leased sites are operated by rail operators (in fact, the 
majority are operated by one firm: DB Schenker). Even the principle of alienation (where 
a terminal can be transferred to another owner if their services stop and someone else has 
services to that site) is based on which operator runs services. 
An obvious comparison is with the USA where the rail industry is vertically 
integrated, from the track to the terminal to the services. Even in European countries, 
with vertical separation between track infrastructure and services, many service operators 
also operate terminals. Sweden is thus an unusual case where terminal operation is mostly 
by specialist terminal operators handling trains from other companies. This reduces issues 
such as managing alienation of a lease (as in the UK) but it means that terminal 
operations are less aligned with service requirements, as well as introducing transaction 
costs between the two companies as well as potential disagreements over pricing. 
5.7 Maintenance 
In Sweden, all agreements being signed between traffic authority, terminal infrastructure 
owner and/or terminal operator have clearly defined the physical boundaries of the 
infrastructure and the responsibilities related to maintenance and capacity planning. 
There are, however, rarely formulations related to the opportunity of collaborative efforts 
concerning tasks such as maintenance, snow clearance, etc., leaving considerable 
uncertainty over the potential for future unplanned costs arising. In the UK, this problem 
is resolved as everything within the site boundary is the responsibility of the terminal 
operator, while everything outside is the responsibility of the infrastructure owner, with a 
contract establishing the annual maintenance fee for those parts of the public way relating 
to the private terminal operator (e.g., switches, connecting tracks). 
6 Conclusions 
The port governance literature analysed in Section 2 demonstrated that the landlord 
model is a common governance structure to blend public and private motivations and 
outcomes. In the Swedish context, terminal infrastructure owners, usually a public actor, 
would prefer to play the landlord role but, due to their contracts with industry actors, 
continuously find themselves involved in daily operational and commercial situations. 
From a contractual agreements perspective, this is not surprising; given the fact that a lot 
of responsibilities and authority (e.g., snow clearance, traffic management) are linked 
directly back to the terminal infrastructure owner. This problem is amplified by issues 
such as divergence of time perspectives and unclearly defined incentives and principles 
of terminal operator hand-over. These issues are relevant not only to the individual cases 
but also reduce the efficiency of the intermodal system as a whole; for instance, a rail 
operator will be uncertain how much to charge its customers to recover its costs if it is 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The role of contracts in achieving effective governance 33    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
not clear on fees or requirements on using a particular terminal or if there is uncertainty 
over responsibility for safety or snow clearance. 
In the UK, sites are given on such long leases (and on a token ‘peppercorn’ rent) that 
they are almost given away. But the infrastructure owner retains control and if the site is 
not being used then it can take the site back. In Sweden, there is no specification in the 
initial funding contract to prevent this, even if the terminal was financed entirely by the 
public sector (e.g., municipality and national rail authority). Yet UK contracts have less 
control over the operator because once a site is given for 125 years on almost no rent, the 
operator is free to operate or invest as they see fit, with no public control to incentivise 
behaviour. 
Another key observation is the lack of exercised power by the transport authority in 
many cases. Through the traffic agreement with terminal infrastructure owners they have 
the opportunity and ability to define and ensure key principles such as e.g., open access 
and return of public investments in case of the terminal being sold in the future. Yet few 
observations have been made in Sweden where such principles have been defined in the 
agreement between the rail authority and terminal infrastructure owner. In the UK, the 
infrastructure owner also exerts little control on the terminal operation; the view appears 
to be that as long as the terminal is being used and it does not require management or 
funding from government then that is acceptable. Unless another operator challenges this 
situation with an accusation of anti-competitive behaviour or that the terminal is not in 
fact being used and they would like to take it over, then terminal operators can continue 
as they like. 
The underlying trend in both markets is therefore that public actors do not exert 
significant influence, although in each country this is for different reasons. In Sweden 
they would actually prefer less direct involvement; they want a basic landlord form as 
long as they are able to specify some key conditions. However, due to the form of the 
contracts and the complex incentives involved, they keep getting drawn in to daily 
management and operational discussions. Yet some success is evident in the Swedish 
model; the evidence suggests that operators have been incentivised to enter the market 
and are developing terminals and increasing flows. The public actors want to step back if 
they can but find themselves unable to do so. 
The question arises as to whether it is unrealistic to want to have an active private 
actor developing and operating successful terminals while thinking the public actor can 
make some investments and developments and then step back and retain only a landlord 
position. It may be that they have to remain rather involved through active PPP 
arrangements in order to monitor whether the terminal is achieving the goals for which it 
was funded. What is the best model for achieving this? In the UK, the current model of 
long leases with few conditions makes management simpler for the public actors, 
meaning that they do not have the daily operational difficulties and entanglements that 
the Swedish actors experience. The disadvantage is that private operators are then 
insufficiently incentivised to invest and expand; they can simply occupy old terminals, 
sweating old assets and requesting government funding through the modal shift grants 
system when they need upgrades. Similar criticisms have been made of the  
fully-privatised UK port model (Baird, 2013). 
One difficulty underlining these trends (both the undesirably active role in Sweden 
and the overly inactive role in the UK) is that government actors (at all levels) do  
not have the knowledge to specify contracts. This results in all sorts of different  
contracts with divergent time periods and responsibilities with very few penalties for  
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non-compliance, if it can even be identified and assessed. What is needed in Sweden is 
for government agencies to use industry expertise to draw up a generic contract that can 
be applied across the sector to increase standardisation and reduce divergent contracts 
with misaligned motivations and instruments for achieving them. Likewise in the UK, a 
standard contract form with increased stipulations could be utilised to incentivise more 
proactive developments by private operators that would reduce the risk of competitors 
complaining that they are not fulfilling the terms of said contracts. Intermodal transport 
developed as a mode due to increasing standardisation of equipment from container sizes 
to wagon types to cranes and handling techniques. Such standardisation must also be 
applied to contracts in order to facilitate successful intermodal transport. The research in 
this paper can be used in future research as a basis to develop a template applicable in 
other national contexts to compare how the same contractual features are managed in 
other cases, working towards a standard framework for analysis. 
It was noted in the literature review that TCE and RBV have been used fruitfully in 
logistics research to analyse the management of relationships and resources. Now that 
this paper has identified and classified different kinds of contracts and how they are used 
as a governance form to manage these transactions and resources, future research could 
use TCE or RBV to explore these issues in greater depth. The particular roles of the 
actors identified in this research (terminal owners, terminal operators, rail operators and 
rail regulators) could be explored through an actor-centric analysis using either of these 
theoretical approaches. Such research could provide deeper understanding of how the 
interests of these actors tend to result in certain governance forms that may inhibit the 
achievement of policy goals. From a practical perspective, future research on such 
contracts could also explore additional desirable features, such as how the concessioning 
process should take place, standard requirements for tenderers and other allowances such 
as, for example, using overweight or longer trucks to bring containers to the terminal or 
subsidised rents for logistics platform tenants utilising a terminal. 
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Notes 
1 Since 1991, EU directive 91/440 has required that all EU countries separate management of 
infrastructure from services. Even if the national company still operates both, full separation 
of management and transparent charging and accounting is required, in order to facilitate  
on-rail competition across a shared infrastructure. 
2 Exceptions being Beresford et al. (2012), Monios (2013), Rodrigue et al. (2010), Rodrigue  
et al. (2013) – for more discussion see Monios (2014). 
3 For a detailed account of the privatisation of the UK rail industry, see Nash (2002). 
4 Railtrack was created as a private commercial company but it went bankrupt and infrastructure 
ownership was then repackaged under the ownership of Network Rail, a nominally-private 
company but owned solely by the government. Fowkes and Nash (2004) suggest that keeping 
the infrastructure publicly owned (as in Sweden) was better than the UK model where the 
infrastructure owner attempted to act as a commercial company. 
5 For a detailed account of the liberalisation of the Swedish rail industry, see Alexandersson and 
Rigas (2013). 
